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ENFORCING CALIFORNIA'S FALSE ADVERTISING
LAW: A GUIDE TO ADJUDICATION
False advertising is a substantial evil in our society, undermining
fair competition,' defrauding consumers of millions-if not billions-
of dollars annually,2 while victimizing frequently the elderly and the
poor.3 Although California has been liberal in affording defrauded
consumers class remedies,4 such private actions have generally proven
inadequate weapons in fighting false advertising. 5 Recognizing this,
the California legislature has supplemented private remedies with
broad, publicly enforced measures. 6  In doing so, the state's name,
power, and investigative resources are added to the prosecution.7
The statutory basis of all major false advertising prosecutions in
1. See Developments in the Law-Deceptive Advertising, 80 HAv. L. Ray.
1005 (1967).
2. See generally Lorenz, Consumer Fraud and the San Diego District Attor-
ney's Office, 8 SAN DEGo L. REV. 47 (1971); Comment, Translating Sympathy for
Deceived Consumers Into Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395
(1966).
3. Project-The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 883, 965-66 (1969). See generally D. CAPLoVrrz, ThE POOR PAY MoRE (1967);
Emeh, The Ripoff Game, San Francisco Sunday Chronicle & Examiner, June 10, 1973
(California Living), at 22.
4. E.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr.
796 (1971). See generally Note, Judicial Protection for the Consumer: Vasquez v.
Superior Court, 23 HAsTINGS LJ. 513 (1972).
5. A consumer's ability to seek individual redress is drastically limited by the
fact that many consumers do not know when they have been abused, do not know
how to seek a lawyer, and cannot afford a lawyer's fees if one is found. Furthermore,
the typical consumer transaction is too small to justify the expense of the legal time
necessary for proper representation. Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit
Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 41 (1969). In the proper situation, many of the afore-
mentioned disadvantages of the individual action are overcome by a class action. How-
ever, California law is in a confused state as to when such class actions are maintain-
able and thus the usefulness of the class action is minimized. Note, The Role of Cali-
fornia's Attorney General and District Attorneys in Protecting the Consumer, 4 U.C.
DAvis L. REv. 35, 42-43 (1971).
6. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500-17572 (West 1964 & Supp. 1974).
7. See Lorenz, Consumer Fraud and the San Diego District Attorney's Office,
8 SAN DIEO L. RFv. 47, 48-50 (1971). Two other advantages are realized by cen-
tralizing the enforcement of false advertising laws in governmental agencies: (1) The
interests of judicial economy are better served by consolidating complaints; and (2)
A more effective overall approach to prevention is achieved through the selection of
highly visible or particularly unscrupulous defendants.
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California is Business and Professions Code section 17500.8 The Leg-
islature enacted this section in 1941, drawing together various Printers'
Ink Statutes9 and provided a comprehensive prohibition against vir-
tually all deceptive advertising, whether intentional or unintentional.' °
To enforce section 17500, the legislature in 1941 provided a
criminal sanction in section 17534 of the Business and Professions
Code, which makes violation of section 17500 a misdemeanor punish-
able by a $500 fine and/or six months in jail." It appears, however,
that criminal procedure has proven to be too burdensome and the pun-
ishment too light for section 17534 to be an effective weapon against
false advertising, for there have been few prosecutions under this sec-
tion. 2 Nevertheless, the statute remains on the books.
8. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 1964). CAL. CIV. CODE § 3369
and 3370.1 (West Supp. 1974) provide for prosecution of unfair trade practices in gen-
eral and are often used in conjunction with CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West
1964) to prosecute false advertisers. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 3370.1 (West Supp. 1974) car-
ries with it a provision for monetary penalties identical to those in CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 17536 (West Supp. 1974), the subject of this note. The discussion of penalties
under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17536 (West Supp. 1974), therefore, will be equally
applicable to CAL. Civ. CODE H5 3369, 3370.1 (West Supp. 1974).
9. American consumer fraud statutes originated with a proposal in Printers' Ink
magazine in 1911 recommending a false advertising law that was subsequently adopted,
in original or modified form, in forty-four states and the District of Columbia. Note,
The Regulation of Advertising, 56 COLuM. L. REv. 1018, 1058 (1956).
10. "It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association, or any em-
ployee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal property
or to perform services, professional or otherwise, or anything of any nature whatsoever
or to induce the public to enter into any obligation relating thereto, to make or dissem-
inate or cause to be made or disseminated before the public in this State, in any news-
paper or other publication, or any advertising device, or by public outcry or proclama-
tion, or in any other manner or means whatever, any statement, concerning such real
or personal property or services, professional or otherwise, or concerning any circum-
stance or matter of fact connected with the proposed performance or disposition
thereof, which is untrue or misleading, and which is known, or which by the exercise
of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or misleading, or for any such person,
firm, or corporation to make or disseminate or cause to be so made or so disseminated
any such statement as part of a plan or scheme with the intent not to sell such personal
property or services, professional or otherwise, so advertised at the price stated therein,
or as so advertised." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17500 (West 1964). Cf. People
v. Wahl, 39 Cal. App. 2d 771, 773, 100 P.2d 550, 551 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1940)
(liberally interpreting elements of false advertising under former statute).
11. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17534 (West 1964); CAL. PEN. CODE § 19 (West
1970).
12. REvIEw OF SELECTED 1965 CODE LEGISLATIoN 21 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed.
1965). See also Lorenz, Consumer Fraud and the San Diego District Attorney's Of-
fice, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 47, 48 (1971); Project-The Direct Selling Industry Project,
16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 883, 960 (1969).
Commenting on the factors which detract from the effectiveness of the criminal
penalties involved, one authority stated: "Since [the nature of the conduct restrained]
is not criminal under traditional categories of crime and, apart from the regulatory pro-
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Business and Professions Code section 17535, also enacted in
1941, empowers the attorney general or the district attorney to seek
injunctions against false advertising. This section was also greatly
broadened in 1972. As amended, section 17535 now permits any
county counsel, city attorney or city prosecutor, as well as the attorney
general and district attorney, to seek whatever equitable relief the
court deems necessary to prevent false advertising, specifically includ-
ing the remedies of receivership and restitution for defrauded parties.' 3
In 1973 the legislature created an expedited remedy for disobedience
of section 17535 court orders: rather than suing formally for contempt
of the court order, prosecutors may now seek in priority proceedings
summary penalties for repeating wrongdoers of up to $6,000 l5er day
of violation.' 4
In 1965, the Legislature recognized that the false advertising rem-
edies then in force were inadequate since criminal prosecutions had
proven too cumbersome and injunctive relief had only affected pros-
pective behavior. In response to the need for a more effective rem-
scription closely resembles acceptable aggressive business behavior, the stigma of moral
reprehensibility does not naturally associate itself with the regulated conduct. More-
over, the conduct is engaged in by persons of relatively high social and economic sta.
tus; since it is motivated by economic considerations, it is calculated and deliberate
rather than reactive; it is usually part of a pattern of business conduct rather than
episodic in character; and it often involves group action through the corporate form.'
Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic
Regulations, 30 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 423, 425-26 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
13. "Any person, corporation, firm, partnership, joint stock company, or any
other association or organization which violates or proposes to violate this chapter may
be enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction. The court may make such orders or
judgments, including the appointment of a receiver, as may be necessary to prevent
the use or employment by any person, corporation, firm, partnership, joint stock com-
pany, or any other association or organization of any practices which violate this chap-
ter, or which may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any money or prop-
erty, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of any practice in this
chapter declared to be unlawful.
Actions for injunction under this section may be prosecuted by the Attorney Gen-
eral or any district attorney, county counsel, city attorney, or city prosecutor in this
state in the name of the people of the State of California upon their own complaint
or upon the complaint of any board, officer, person, corporation or association or by
any person acting for the interests of itself, its members or the general public." CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17535 (West Supp. 1974).
The prosecuting attorney often couples a prayer for all of the applicable equitable
remedies with a prayer for monetary penalties under section 17536. See note 15 infra.
E.g., People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192
(1973).
14. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE §§ 17534-36 (West 1964 & Supp. 1974) are statu-
tory remedies available for a variety of deceptive trade practices enumerated in id. §§
17500-533 (West 1964 & Supp. 1974). Of these deceptive trade practices, the major
prosecutions under these statutes have been for false advertising.
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edy, the legislature enacted the sanction which is the focus of this note,
section 17536 of the Business and Professions Code.15 Section 17536
provides for a "civil" penalty of up to $2,500 for each violation of
section 17500.16 Courts have interpreted this to mean up to $2,500
15. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17535.5 (West Supp. 1974) provides:
"(a) Any person who intentionally violates any injunction issued pursuant to sec-
tion 17535 shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed six thousand dollars
($6,000) for each violation. Where the conduct constituting a violation is of a contin-
uing nature, each day of such conduct is a separate and distinct violation. In determin-
ing the amount of the civil penalty, the court shall consider all relevant circumstances,
including, but not limited to, the extent of harm caused by the conduct constituting
a violation, the nature and persistence of such conduct, the length of time over which
the conduct occurred, and any corrective action taken by the defendant.
(b) The civil penalty prescribed by this section shall be assessed and recovered
in a civil action brought in the name of the people of the State of California by the
Attorney General or by any district attorney, county counsel, or city attorney in any
court of competent jurisdiction. An action brought pursuant to this section to recover
such civil penalties shall take special precedence over all civil matters on the calendar
of the court except those matters to which equal precedence on the calendar is granted
by law.
(c) If such an action is brought by the Attorney General, one-half of the penalty
collected pursuant to this section shall be paid to the treasurer of the county in which
the judgment was entered, and one-half to the state treasurer. If brought by a district
attorney or county counsel, the entire amount of the penalty collected shall be paid to the
treasurer of the county in which the judgment was entered. If brought by a city attor-
ney or city prosecutor, one-half of the penalty shall be paid to the treasurer of the
county in which the judgment was entered and one-half to the city."
16. "(a) Any person who violates any provision of this chapter, except Section
17530, shall be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed two thousand five hundred dol-
lars ($2,500) for each violation, which shall be assessed and recovered in a civil action
brought in the name of the people of the State of California by the Attorney General
or by any district attorney, county counsel, or city attorney in any court of competent
jurisdiction.
(b) If the action is brought by the Attorney General, one-half of the penalty col-
lected shall be paid to the treasurer of the county in which the judgment was entered,
and one-half to the State Treasurer. If brought by a district attorney or county coun-
sel, the entire amount of penalty collected shall be paid to the treasurer of the county
in which the judgment was entered. If brought by a city attorney or city prosecutor,
one-half of the penalty shall be paid to the treasurer of the county and one-half to
the city.
(c) If the action is brought at the request of a board within the Department of
Consumer Affairs, the court shall determine the reasonable expenses incurred by the
board in the investigation and prosecution of the action.
Before any penalty collected is paid out pursuant to subdivision (b), the amount
of such reasonable expenses incurred by the board shall be paid to the State Treasurer
for deposit in the special fund of the board described in Section 205. If the board
has no such special fund the moneys shall be paid to the State Treasurer.
As used in this subdivision, 'board' includes commission, bureau, division, and
other similarly constituted agency." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17536 (West Supp.
1974).
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for each offeree who perceives the misleading advertisement.' 7  Given
the circulation of a single advertisement, penalties for one mass false
solicitation can easily mount into the tens or hundreds of thousands of
dollars.' 8  Considering that these penalties can presently be assessed over
and above any restitution ordered to be paid injured parties, it can be
seen that the penalties of section 17536 are quite severe.' 9
Indeed, section 17536 penalties are virtually indistinguishable in
form and effect from criminal fines:2" (1) the actions are brought
in the name of the People by state or local prosecutors; (2) the penal-
ties are paid directly to the coffers of the government; and (3) the
purposes of section 17536 are plainly retributive and deterrent, given
the severity of the penalty.
With the criminal overtones of this civil penalty, it is possible that
defendants in actions brought pursuant to section 17536 might seek
the protections of criminal procedure. Thus, wherever civil and crim-
17. People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192
(1973).
18. Indeed, the state attorney general recently recovered a one million dollar pen-
alty from Bestline Products, Inc. for false advertising and unfair trade practices. Peo-
ple v. Bestline Products, Inc., Civil No. C-2842 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, Cali-
fornia, filed July 26, 1973). In People v. Witzerman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 284 (1972), the court assessed penalties of $50,000 under section 17536. Large
settlements have also been obtained in People v. Goodyear, Inc., Civil No. 99310
(Super. Ct., Santa Barbara County, California, filed April 25, 1973) ($80,000).
Violators wishing to avoid unfavorable publicity often stipulate to an injunction
and penalties before a complaint is filed. For example, The Emporium department
store avoided litigating a complaint in Santa Clara County by agreeing to an injunction
and $10,000 penalties. Telephone interview with Clay Howpert, Deputy District At-
torney, Consumer Fraud Division, Santa Clara County, California, Nov. 9, 1973.
19. Indeed, the monetary penalties under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17536 (West
Supp. 1974) may be the most stringent false advertising remedies in the country. Sin-
ilar penalties in other states include e.g., NJ. R.Bv. STAT. 56:8-13-16 (Supp. 1973) (not
more than $2,000 for the first offense, not more than $5,000 for each subsequent of-
fense); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 350(c) (McKinney Supp. 1973) ($500 per violation).
For wilful violations see, e.g., S.D. CowmED LAws ANN. § 37-24-27 (1972) ($2,000
per violation). For a tabulation of false advertising remedies by state see Lovett, State
Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TuL. L. REv. 724, 757-60 (1972). A number
of states listed in Lovett have followed the precedent of the Federal Trade Commission
and provided for civil penalties only upon the violation of an injunction or cease and
desist order, making the remedy in the nature of a contempt citation. See Dole, Mer-
chant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 76
YALE L. 485 (1967); Kintner, Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Advertising,
64 MIfcH. L. REv. 1269 (1966). While the notice provided by the injunction or order
satisfies certain notions of due process, it also allows the lawbreaker "one free bite"
before he is punished. A scheme of immediate civil enforcement is, therefore, thought
to be more protective of consumers. See W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SIDE
OF THnE MARKEPAcE 70 (1968).
20. People v. Witzerman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 177, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284, 289
(1973).
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inal procedures differ in the course of seotion 17536 litigation, ques-
tions as to the proper procedure potentially arise. For example, can
the state court exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants
through the use of civil process? Must the standards of criminal or
civil pleading apply? Do civil or criminal statutes of limitation apply?
Are there search and seizure or self-incrimination protections available
to shield defendants from discovery or from examination at trial?
Does the defendant have a right to a trial by jury? Does the Sixth
Amendment right of confrontation apply? What is the standard of
proof? Is a second prosecution by the government blocked by the
double jeopardy clause? Finally, is the judgment extraterritorially en-
forceable?
In false advertising prosecutions under section 17536 to date, de-
fendants have often raised the question of criminal versus civil proce-
dure,2' and the results have not been uniform from county to county.
21. E.g., People v. Earl Scheib, Inc., Civil No. 340826 (Super. Ct., San Diego
County, California, filed Aug. 24, 1973); People v. Ortho Mattress, Inc., Civil No.
345778 (Super. Ct., San Diego County, California, filed Aug. 24, 1973); People v.
Witzerman, Civil No. 890068 (Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, California, filed Nov.
25, 1970), aff'd, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1972).
The most frequently raised question is the availability of the Fifth Amendment
in discovery. Mr. Hershal Elkins, Depty Attorney General, Consumer Fraud Unit, Los
Angeles, the state's chief consumer advocate, states that the self-incrimination problem
arises in many cases, and courts often will grant protective orders based on the facts
of the particular cases. Telephone interview with Hershal Elkins, Aug. 2, 1973. Mr.
John Porter, Assistant Attorney General, Consumer Fraud Unit, San Francisco, also
states that the civil-criminal question has been raised several times and needs to be
definitively resolved. Telephone interview with John Porter, Feb. 17, 1973. Likewise,
Mr. Gordon Bowley, formerly of the state attorney general's office, now Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney for Sacramento County, as well as Professor Thomas McCall, formerly
of the state attorney general's office, now Associate Professor of Law, Hastings College
of the Law, agree that procedural problems have inhibited, and may continue to inhibit
false advertising prosecutions until the civil-criminal questions are resolved. Telephone
interview with Gordon Bowley, Feb. 9, 1973. Interview with Thomas McCall in San
Francisco, California, Nov. 7, 1973.
Most representatives of county consumer fraud units who were interviewed indi-
cated that their experience has been that defendants seek an early settlement of false
advertising claims to avoid adverse publicity. Consequently, these procedural prob-
lems often do not arise. All those interviewed, however, felt that section 17536 has
significant quasi-criminal overtones which could give rise to potential procedural prob-
lems. Telephone interviews with John Stillman, Deputy District Attorney for Con-
sumer Fraud, Los Angeles County; Clay Howpert, Deputy District Attorney, Consumer
Fraud Division, Santa Clara County; Sam Mesnick, Assistant District Attorney, Contra
Costa County; James R. Grube, Assistant District Attorney, Consumer Protection Di-
vision, City and County of San Francisco, Nov. 9, 1973.
Walt Matthews, Deputy District Attorney for Consumer Protection in Santa Bar-
bara County, unlike any of his colleagues interviewed, files a criminal action simultan-
eously with the filing of his civil complaint to expedite settlement. Since criminal ac-
tions with their attendant publicity would be tried within two or three months of filing,
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For example, lower courts in Los Angeles and San Luis Obispio Coun-
ties have rejected demurrers which asserted that section 17536 is a
criminal statute that cannot be civilly enforced; 22 whereas a trial court
in Sacramento County citing the criminal nature of the penalties,
limited the prosecutor to criminal discovery procedures,2 3 and a trial
court in San Diego County imposed the shorter criminal statute of limi-
tations on the action.24 At the same time, the defendants have been
able to challenge and seek review of such procedural rulings by a writ
of mandate, thus delaying prosecution.25 Only two procedural rulings
on the civil-criminal issue have been handed down by appellate courts,
and these rulings have been restricted to the narrow questions pre-
sented in each case: (1) the right to a jury trial under the Sixth
Amendment, 2 and (2) the stringency of pleading requirements. 27
Thus, for the answers to the many other as yet unresolved proce-
dural problems arising under section 17536 one must turn to analogous
case law. In doing so, however, one soon discovers that cases setting
forth steps to be followed under similar penalties are not easily recon-
ciled. As explained below, courts have used various tests to ascertain
whether a sanction is civil or criminal, but such tests of the sanction
are not determinative of procedure. Instead, the standards of due
process must be examined procedure by procedure. 28  This note,
therefore, reviews the authority for each procedural question to deter-
mine, at the major junctures of section 17536 litigation, whether civil
or criminal procedures should be followed. Civil procedures, of
course, would be more expedient and thus more effective against false
advertising, but such expediency cannot be obtained at the expense
of the defendant's rights to due process. In the end, it is shown that
he feels the pending criminal count gives him a significant bargaining tool in forcing
a rapid settlement. This practice seems to be unique to Mr. Matthews, and as a result
of the practice, he has on occasion allowed individual defendants to invoke the Fifth
Amendment at depositions. All of his cases, however, have settled well before trial.
Telephone interview with Walt Matthews, Nov. 9, 1973.
22. People v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1972), vacated, 9 Cal. 3d 283,
507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973); and People v. Grolier Society, Inc., Civil
No. 37394 (Super. Ct., San Luis Obispo County, California, filed Sept. 7, 1973).
23. People v. Anderson, Civil No. 210781 (Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Cali-
fornia, filed Dec. 29, 1971).
24. People v. Earl Scheib, Inc., Civil No. 340826 (Super. Ct., San Diego County,
California, filed Sept. 26, 1973).
25. E.g., People v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1972), vacated, 9 Cal.
3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973); People v. Grolier Society, Inc.,
Civil No. 37394 (Super. Ct., San Luis Obispo County, California, filed Sept. 7, 1973).
26. People v. Witzerman, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1972). See
text accompanying notes 93-101 infra.
27. People v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1972), vacated, 9 Cal. 3d 283,
507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973). See text accompanying notes 53-60 infra.
28. See text accompanying notes 30-45 infra.
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predominantly civil procedures will apply to section 17536 prosecu-
tions, despite the many criminal characteristics of the penalty.
Because of the importance of section 17536 as a false advertising
remedy in California, and because of the generally emerging interest
in the use of civil penalties to enforce regulations of contemporary
social concern, such as, pollution control, consumer protection, and dis-
crimination,29 this note offers its guide to adjudication under section
17536. Hopefully, it will aid courts in reaching uniform results and
deprive defendants of dilatory tactics.
Civil or Criminal Procedures? The Missing Test
To determine whether civil or criminal procedures should be ap-
plied in a particular case, most courts first attempt to characterize the
sanction as civil or criminal, and having decided one way or the other,
they apply the procedures accordingly. Yet, as fundamental as the
distinction between civil and criminal law is to our system of jurispru-
dence, the courts have not applied a uniform test in making this de-
lineation. Instead, when confronted with the problem, the courts have
employed diverse, often irreconcilable criteria.3"
A number of courts have held, for example, that legislative intent
is determinative, ruling that if the language of the statute indicates
whether the sanction is civil or criminal, then the manifest expression
of legislative intent should be honored, and procedures applied accord-
ingly.3 However, in opposition to the line of cases holding legislative
29. E.g., Kovel, A Case For Civil Penalties: Air Pollution Control, 46 J. URBAN
L. 153 (1969).
30. On civil penalties and the criminal-civil distinction see Note, Statutory Penal-
ties-A Legal Hybrid, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1092 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Statutory
Penalties]; and Note, Punishment: Its Meaning in Relation to Separation of Power
and Substantive Constitutional Restrictions and Its Use in the Lovett, Trop, Perez, and
Speiser Cases, 34 IND. L. J. 231 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Punishment: Its Mean-
ing]. Both of these notes discuss civil penalties, the former being an extensive survey
of case law and the latter being a more theoretical discussion of penalties. Alas, both
end more with a whimper than a bang, for the former finds case law so anomolous
that its best recommendation is to resolve procedural questions on a case by case
method. "No court, apparently, has thoughtfully analyzed the nature of this action
in order to place its decision on clearly justifiable grounds." Statutory Penalties, supra,
at 1100.). The latter commentator calls for clarification of the role of governmental
sanctions, concluding that then and only then can the criminal and civil burdens be
apportioned. "[Olne cannot expect too much from a theory." Punishment: Its Mean-
ing, supra, at 287. "Possibly the conclusion is that there are no workable standards
at all." Id. at n.237.
See also Kovel, A Case For Civil Penalties: Air Pollution Control, 46 URBAN L.
153 (1968); Note, Actions for False Advertising Under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code Section
17536: An Argument for Applying Civil Rules of Proof, 5 U.S.F.L. REv. 440 (1971).
31. Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909) held that the statute under
which the action was brought was civil because it contained the terms "sue for and
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intent to be dispositive, there is equally strong authority holding that
it is not controlling in the least: "[QCivil labels and good intentions
do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process safe-
guards."32  Thus, legislative intent cannot be said to be determina-
tive.83
Other courts deem an action to be criminal if the statutory viola-
tion is a "public offense."8 4  Blackstone enunciated this test in his
Commentaries, basing the civil-criminal distinction on whether the
conduct offended an individual's private fights or the community's pub-
lic rights.3 5  But when is harm to one not harm to all, and is such
a distinction not entirely a matter of degree? Blackstone's test, there-
fore, seems to offer no real practical guidelines for drawing the line
between civil and criminal law.3 6
Other criteria have been put forth to determine whether a sanc-
tion is civil or criminal. In general, however, they represent oversim-
plistic attempts to provide a litmus test for criminality, and conse-
quently they fail because of their superficiality. For example, two
such tests are: (1) whether the action is brought by the state or by
an individual,3 7 and (2) whether it is initiated by information or indict-
ment. 38
No matter which test the courts have used, their attempts first
to characterize the sanction as criminal or civil and then to decide the
procedural question have led to uneven results. For example, in Lees
v. United States39 and Hepner v. United States4 6 the Supreme Court
was dealing with the same type of offense-violation of alien labor
laws. In Lees the Court extended the protection of the Fifth Amend-
recover," therefore upholding the lower court's power to direct a verdict; United States
v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914) held that the civil burden of proof applied because
the statute used the language "sued for and recovered" and "as debts of like amounts
are now recovered." In Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938), the statute called
for payment to be collected "by distraint," indicating to the Court the legislative intent
that the statute was civil and that as a consequence double jeopardy would not attach.
In Madonna v. State, 151 Cal. App. 2d 836, 840, 312 P.2d 257, 260 (1957) the court
stated: "The fact that the statute provides that the penalty shall be recovered by a
civil action has been regarded as conclusive of the nature of the action."
32. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970).
33. See, e.g., United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568 (1930).
34. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668, 673-74 (1892); Iowa v. Chicago
B. & Q. R.R., 37 F. 497, 501 (Iowa 1889), appeal dismissed, 145 U.S. 631 (1892).
35. 4 W. BLACKSToNE, Com1.mNTAram~s 2 (G. Tucker ed. 1803).
36. See Punishment: Its Meaning, supra note 30, at 286-87.
37. See generally H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF IAW AND STATE 50 (1945);
Punishment: Its Meaning, supra note 30, at 278-79; Statutory Penalties, supra note 30,
at 1096.
38. Statutory Penalties, supra note 30, at 1096.
39. 150 U.S. 476 (1893).
40. 213 U.S. 103 (1909).
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ment to the defendant, while in Hepner the Court held that the de-
fendant's right to jury trial was not denied by a directed verdict for
the government. Thus, similar statutory offenses were held to be
criminal for one procedural purpose and civil for another. Similarly,
the United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess41 and United States ex rel.
Brensilber v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,42 the very same statute was
held to be civil for one purpose and criminal for another. In Marcus
the Supreme Court held that the defendant was not put in double jeop-
ardy when he was both criminally and civilly prosecuted for obtaining
a government contract by fraud. The penalties, even though three
times the amount of the criminal fine, were held to be civil in nature.
In Bausch and Lomb, however, the Second Circuit held the same stat-
ute to be "not only penal, but drastically penal,"" in requiring that
the statute be strictly construed. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision per curiam" only a few months after handing down Marcus
v. Hess.
These cases illustrate that the consideration of the sanction alone
is not sufficient to determine the procedural rights of the defendant.
Instead, the nature of the right must also be weighed, and each pro-
cedure considered separately." 5 As the cases illustrate, the decision
of a court on the one procedural point may not control its decision
on another. Consequently, in the following guide to procedural rights,
the authority on each procedure is examined independently. In this
way, the guide to adjudication can conform to the due process require-
ments of controlling case law.
A Procedural Guide to False Advertising Actions
Initiating the Action
Jursidiction. If, for jurisdictional purposes, section 17536 were
deemed criminal in nature, the territorial jurisdiction of the court
would be limited to the boundaries of the state. 6 On the other hand,
if section 17536 were found to be civil in nature, the longarm statute
and other liberal means of obtaining jurisdiction over the person would
41. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
42. 131 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd, 320 U.S. 711 (1943).
43. Id. at 547.
44. 320 U.S. 711 (1943).
45. This approach was suggested, but not expressly followed in Helvering v.
Mitchell where Justice Brandeis stated: "In determining whether particular rules of
criminal procedure are applicable to civil actions to enforce sanctions, the cases have
usually attempted to distinguish between the type of procedural rule involved rather
than the kind of sanction being enforced." 303 U.S. 391, 400 n.3 (1938).
46. If CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17536 (West Supp. 1974) is considered crimi-
nal for the purposes of jurisdiction, the complicated procedures of extradition must be
used to return defendants to the state. See UNIFORM EXTRADITION ACT § 2.
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be available. 47  For the protection of California consumers, it would
be desirable to have the broadest jurisdiction possible, since, because
of the modem media, the false advertiser can make his deceptive rep-
resentations without ever entering the state, or, as in many false ad-
vertising rackets, the unscrupulous advertisers can operate hit-and-run
rackets which evade prosecution through planned transciency. 48
The question of extraterritorial service of process has not yet
been raised under section 17536. However, in a case involving similar
regulations in New York, a court held that trade violations for which
civil penalties may be recovered constitute simple torts and thus the
violator is subject to the service of process just as any other tortfeasor
who has injured parties within the state.49
The jurisdictional problem of extraterritorial service of process
should not be confused with the conflict-of-laws problem of extraterri-
torial enforcement of a judgment. While it has been shown that proc-
ess may extend over state lines, the collection of the judgment may
not. It is a well established rule of conflicts that the court of one
state will not execute the penal laws of another, and for many years
this rule has been applied to civil penalties.50 Thus, in section 17536
actions, California has the power to submit out-of-state defendants to
civil jurisdiction, but not to enforce its penalties outside the state.
Venue. There would be no difference in the proper place for
trial should the court find section 17536 civil or criminal, because the
controlling civil venue statute5' comports with the Sixth Amendment52
in making the proper venue the county where the cause or some part
thereof arose.
47. "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent
with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc.
§ 410.10 (West 1973). See also id. § 415.40 (service outside the state); id. § 415.50
(service by publication).
48. See generally W. MAGNuSEN & J. CARPER, T1m DARa SmD. OF THE MA KT-
PLACE (1968).
49. State v. Davies, 24 App. Div. 2d 240, 265 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1965), affd, 18
N.Y.2d 950, 277 N.Y.S.2d 146, 223 N.E.2d 570 (1966) (violation of New York's anti-
trust law, N.Y. GExN. Bus. LAw § 342(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973), providing a $20,000
civil penalty payable to the state).
50. E.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
51. "Subject to the power of the court to transfer actions and proceedings as pro-
vided in this title, the county in which the cause, or some part thereof, arose, is the
proper county for the trial of the following actions: (a) For the recovery of a penalty
or forfeiture imposed by statute . . . ." CAL. CoDE Civ. PRoc. § 393(1) (a) (West
1973).
52. 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law
... ." U.S. CoNsT. Amend VI.
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Pleading. The standards of pleading in a section 17536 action
have been litigated and ruled upon by the California Supreme Court
in People v. Superior Court, Jayhill real party in interest." In Jayhill,
the attorney general filed a complaint for section 17536 civil penalties
against an encyclopedia company alleging a "scheme to sell encyclo-
pedias, other publications and related services to members of the pub-
lic by making false and misleading statements and engaging in other
acts of unfair competition."54  By way of demurrer, the defendant
challenged the specificity of the pleading. 5 Upholding the trial court,
the court of appeals on a writ of mandate held that each violation
of section 17500 had to be pleaded as a separate paragraph, even
if it be a "Doe-type" paragraph. Furthermore, it held that each sep-
arate misleading statement to each individual constituted a cause of
action under section 17536.56 Requiring that each misleading state-
ment to each consumer be alleged in a separate paragraph, however,
resembles more the criminal pleading of counts or charges than the
liberal rules of civil pleading.
The California Supreme Court, however, reversed the appellate
court, settling the question of pleading requirements by stating:
[E]videntiary facts need not be pleaded, and the acts relied upon
by the Attorney General as constituting the violations are alleged
in sufficient detail to apprise defendants of the basis of the cause
of action. If defendants require further specifics in order to pre-
pare their defense, such matters may be the subject of discovery
proceedings. 57
Thus, the civil rules of pleading apply to actions brought under section
17536.
Note, however, that both the court of appeals and the California
Supreme Court in reaching their decisions endeavored to construe sec-
tion 17536 so as to reduce its potential severity. The appellate court
tried to impose strict pleading requirements to lessen the severity of
the penalty, but placed no limits on the causes of action, allowing as-
sessment of up to $2,500 for each representation. 58  The supreme
court, on the other hand, allowed liberal pleading, but expressly lim-
ited penalties "one-to-a-customer," as it were, by construing the statute
to assess up to $2,600 for each offeree, rather than each representa-
tion.59
53. 9 Cal. 3d 283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973).
54. People v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. Rptr. 38, 41 (1972), vacated, 9 Cal. 3d
283, 507 P.2d 1400, 107 Cal. Rptr. 192 (1973).
55. Id. at 41-42. While defendant's demurrer was predicated on the severity of
the penalty, the civil-criminal distinction was not specifically argued in this case.
56. Id. at 50-51.
57. 9 Cal. 3d at 288, 507 P.2d at 1403, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
58. People v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1972).
59. "The Attorney General contends that each misrepresentation by a defendant
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The Statute of Limitations. Effective March 7, 1973, the legisla-
ture amended the Code of Civil Procedure section 338 so as to set
the date barring actions under section 17536 at three years from the
date of discovery by the injured party or by any attorney empowered
to sue under the statute-the attorney general, district attorney, or city
or county attorneys and prosecutors. 60 The question then arises as
to what statute of limitations applies to false advertising offenses al-
leged to have occurred prior to March 7, 1973.
If section 17536 were deemed purely criminal, defendants could
argue that the statute of limitations for misdemeanors applied. Under
section 17(a) of the California Penal Code "[a] felony is a crime
which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in a state prison.
Every other crime or public offense is a misdeameanor except those
offenses that are classified as infractions." 61  Therefore, since section
17536 is not punishable by imprisonment and not classified as an in-
fraction, if held to be criminal, it would be a misdemeanor. Under
Penal Code section 801 "[a]n indictment for any misdemeanor must
be found or an information or complaint filed within one year after
its commission."'62 Therefore, if section 17536 is determined to be
criminal, not only would the statute of limitations be lowered from
three years to one year, but the period would begin to run when
the false advertisements were made instead of when the defrauded
consumer or prosecuting attorney became aware of the false advertise-
ment as under the present law.
Alternatively, but to the same effect, defendants could argue that
Code of Civil Procedure section 340(2) also imposes a one-year limi-
tation period. Section 340(2) specifically applies to actions "upon a
statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal action, for a forfeiture
or penalty to the people of the state. .... ",63
constitutes a separate violation subject to a $2,500 civil penalty. As the number of
misrepresentations allegedly committed by defendant Jayhill alone is no less than 25,
under the Attorney General's theory Jayhill would be liable for a $62,500 penalty for
each customer solicited if the allegations were proved. While the intent of section
17536 was to strengthen the hand of the Attorney General in seeking redress for viola-
tions of section 17500, it is unreasonable to assume that the Legislature intended to
impose a penalty of this magnitude for the solicitation of one potential customer.
Rather, we believe, the Legislature intended that the number of violations is to be de-
termined by the number of persons to whom the misrepresentations were made and
not by the number of separately identifiable misrepresentations involved. Thus, regard-
less of how many misrepresentations were allegedly made to any one potential cus-
tomer, the penalty may not exceed $2,500 for each customer solicited by a defendant."
People v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 283, 288-89, 507 P.2d 1400, 1404, 107 Cal. Rptr.
192, 196 (1973) (citations omitted).
60. CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. § 338.8 (West Supp. 1974).
61. CAL. PEN. CODE § 17(a) (West 1970).
62. Id. § 801 (emphasis added).
63. CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 340(2) (West Supp. 1974).
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The legislature cannot extend statutes of limitations so as to re-
vive actions once barred without specific language expressing such an
intent. 4 No such language appears in the recent amendment to Code
of Civil Procedure section 338. Thus, defendants may seek to bar
claims arising one year before March 7, 1973 on the basis of the two
arguments outlined above.
On the other hand, prosecutors suing on section 17500 offenses
committed prior to March 7, 1973 may argue that the three-year stat-
ute of limitations for civil fraud65 has always been applicable by impli-
cation. The hypothesis of such an argument is that when the legis-
lature provides no express statute of limitations for statutory action,
courts will look to the statute most analogous to the one under consid-
eration and set the period accordingly. The minor premise of the
argument is that civil fraud is most analogous to section 17536, and
thus the three-year limitation for fraud applies.66 The similarities be-
tween civil fraud and section 17536 are apparent since both actions
are for money damages resulting from defendants' misrepresentations.
Furthermore, legislative intent, while not controlling,67 may be
persuasive. In 1965, the legislature enacted the civil penalty provision
of section 17536 to supplement the express misdemeanor sanction of
section 17534.'s Thus, the legislature by implication acknowledged
the inefficacy of the misdemeanor provision, presumably including the
attendant statute of limitations. This implied legislative intent was
made express by the amendment to Code of Civil Procedure section
338 making the civil three-year statute applicable to section 17536
actions.6 19
Defendants, however, may point out that no such implication can
be made and that the amendment was necessary because section 338 (1)
applies a three-year limitation to "actions upon a liability created by
statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture. 70  By the express language
of section 338(1) therefore, the three-year limitation cannot apply be-
cause section 17536 actions clearly seek statutory penalties. The
prosecutors' only retort is that section 338 is clearly written in the dis-
junctive so that the exclusion of statutory penalties in subsection (1)
of 338 in no way affects the fraud provisions of subsection 4.
To date, the only trial court deciding the issue has found in favor
64. See Volkswagen Pacific, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 7 Cal. 3d 48, 60-61
n.4, 496 P.2d 1237, 1246-47 n.4, 101 Cal. Rptr. 869, 878-79 n.4 (1972).
65. See, e.g., Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U.S. 133, 146-49 (1900).
66. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 338.4 (West Supp. 1974).
67. See text accompanying notes 31-33 supra.
68. See REvIEw OF SELECTED 1965 CODE LEGISLATION 21 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar
ed. 1965).
69. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 338.8 (West Supp. 1974).
70. Id. § 338.1 (emphasis added).
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of the defendants, electing to implement the plain words of the statutes
rather than torturing analogies for tenuous implications. 71  The pur-
pose of the penalty, if civil at all, is deterrence of future violations. 72
So, while the omission of the limitation period was an unfortunate leg-
islative oversight, present-day offenders are fully on notice and, thus,
the deterrent effect of the penalty operates in full force. At the same
time defendants are not unfairly subjected to the resurrection of state
claims once barred.
Finally, the significant difference between the criminal and civil
statutes of limitation should be pointed out. As explained above, the
criminal period would run for one year from the date of the commission
of the offense; the civil period, absent the recent statutory change,
not only runs a total of three years, but commences on the date of
discovery of the fraud. As amended, the period is prospectively ex-
tended to the date of discovery by the victim or by the prosecuting
attorney.73 This "tolling" until the prosecutor discovers the offense
compensates for the fact that false advertising victims rarely suffer suf-
ficient injury to report the incident.74  So, under the new statute, until
the prosecution is alerted, the rights of the silent are preserved. The
legislature, therefore, has exercised its power to set reasonable limita-
tions on actions in favor of consumers.7 5 Until March 7, 1975, how-
ever, prosecutors and consumers will have to abide the partial effect
of the criminal statute of limitations.
Discovery
A full discovery using the entire range of civil procedures would
certainly promote efficient and effective prosecution of false advertis-
ers. Deception in advertising, though measured objectively, is a mat-
ter of degree and therefore is hard to prove. Elements of intent
so difficult to elicit could be important to the jury. Furthermore, dis-
covering the full number of offerees for the damages phase of the
deceptive advertising case would be difficult without access to defend-
ant's records, books and true recollections. It is important to prosecu-
tors, therefore, that they be able to request the production of docu-
ments in the custody of the defendant, to request admissions of the
defendant, to propound interrogatories to the defendant, and to re-
quire his testimony in deposition and at trial.
71. People v. Earl Scheib, Inc., Civil No. 340826 (Super. Ct., San Diego County,
California, filed Sept. 26, 1973).
72. See REvIEw OF SELECTD 1965 CODE LEGISLATION 21-22 (Cal. Cont. Educ.
Bar 1965).
73. CAL. CODE CIrv. PRoc. § 338.8 (West Supp. 1974).
74. See note 5 supra.
75. See, e.g., Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902); Sohn v. Waterson, 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 596 (1873).
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At one time, the search and seizure provision of the Fourth
Amendment and its implicit right of privacy would have prevented
the production of defendant's documents in a suit by the government
to assess a penalty. 76 Moreover, the self-incrimination provision of the
Fifth Amendment could have prevented the defendant from testifying
against himself through such documents or through other means of
discovery. Presently, however, these constitutional claims pose few
problems.77
First, it should be noted that corporations are not entitled to in-
voke the Fifth Amendment, since they cannot be incriminated per
se.78  Nor can corporate officials attempt to protect the corporation
by taking the Fifth Amendment on behalf of the corporate entity.79
Instead, the privilege applies only to individuals, and even then the
privilege is restricted. 0
The fountainhead case in this field is Boyd v. United States,"'
which held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights apply to bar
76. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See note 81 infra.
77. However, a trial court in Sacramento County held that the prosecution could
not take defendant's depositions. People v. Anderson, Civil No. 210781 (Super. Ct.
Sacramento County, California, filed Dec. 29, 1971).
78. "It is settled that a corporation is not protected by the constitutional privi-
lege against self-incrimination. A corporate officer may not withhold testimony or
documents on the ground that his corporation would be incriminated. Nor may the
custodian of corporate books or records withhold them on the grounds that he person-
ally might be incriminated by their production. Even after the dissolution of a corpo-
ration and the transfer of its books to any individual stockholders, the transferees may
not invoke their privilege with respect to the former corporate records." Curicio v.
United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122 (1957) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In
Long Island Moving and Storage Ass'n, Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 24 App. Div. 2d 452, 260
N.Y.S.2d 192 (1965), a membership corporation could not resist a subpoena duces
tecum by invoking the privilege against self-incrimination on its own behalf, or on be-
half of its officers.
79. E.g., Curicio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957).
80. "[The privilege against self-incrimination is a purely personal one [and] it
cannot be utilized by or on behalf of . . . a corporation. Moreover, the papers and
effects which the privilege protects must be private property of the person claiming
the privilege, or at least in his possession in a purely personal capacity." United States
v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944) (citations omitted).
81. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). "As, therefore, suits for penalties and forfeitures in-
curred by the commission of offenses against the law, are of quasi-criminal nature, we
think that they are within the reason of criminal proceedings for all purposes of the
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and of that portion of the Fifth Amendment
which declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, and we are further of opinion that a compulsory production of the
private books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit
is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure-and
an unreasonable search and seizure-within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
Id. at 634-35.
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government prosecutors from examining defendant's books in an ac-
tion for monetary penalties, even though authorized to do so by statute.
In Boyd, Justice Bradley presented an extended historical discourse
on the writs of assistance during the Revolutionary Period and the rise
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, emphasizing that the individual
must be protected from such governmental abuse of its power.82
Thus, Boyd was strongly rooted in the past and inextricably tied to
individual rights.
However, Boyd was decided in 1886, before society became so
industrialized that meaningful business regulations were required to
monitor our complex economy, 83 and an erosion of the Boyd rule has
occured. The law first distinguished corporate papers, which were
public, from an individual's private papers, which were still subject
to protection. Then courts held that even private papers which were
comparably impersonal were subject to production. Now, the law re-
quires the production of all but the most personal documents, with
the burden of proof on the defendants to establish their personal char-
acter.8 4  Consequently, it is difficult to imagine the Fourth or Fifth
Amendments and the Boyd rule interfering with defendant's produc-
tion of documents in a prosecution under Business and Professions
Code section 17536.85
Compelling testimony in an action for civil penalties is not sup-
ported by such clearcut authority. A defendant is entitled to assert
his Fifth Amendment rights to avoid self-incrimination, of course, if
he has not been granted immunity from prosecution under the misde-
meanor statute, Business and Professions Code section 17534. Need-
less to say, however, such immunity is routinely granted. 6 Addition-
ally, a defendant who is subjected to potential criminal liability from
other statutes may invoke the privilege. For example, a defendant
in a section 17536 action could not be made to reveal personal infor-
mation which would lead to his criminal conviction for tax fraud.
Lees v. United States, 7 an 1893 case, is the only Supreme Court
case discussing self-incrimination in civil penalty actions. There the
Court reversed the conviction of a defendant who was forced to give
his own deposition, saying;
82. Id. at 624-33.
83. "Thus in response to a burgeoning of the economy in an open society, the
Court was led to examine business documents in aid of regulation of business activities
• . ." In re Mal Brothers Contracting Co., 444 F.2d 615, 618 (1971).
84. E.g., id.; United States v. Quick, 336 F. Supp. 744 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
85. Of course, a forcible search and seizure without benefit of a warrant would
be barred by the Fourth Amendment. Efrain T. Suarez, 58 T.C. 792 (1972).
86. Interview with John F. Porter, Assistant Attorney General, Consumer Fraud
Division, in San Francisco, Feb. 17, 1973.
87. 150 U.S. 476 (1893).
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This, though an action civil in form, is unquestionably criminal
in its nature, and in such a case a defendant cannot be compelled
to be a witness against himself. It is unnecessary to do more than
to refer to the case of Boyd v. United States .. .88
While Lees relied on Boyd, the same erosion of the rule has not
occurred. Instead, the law as to compelled testimony in monetary
penalty actions is presently contradictory. In Bowles v. Towbridge89
the government sought treble damages and the court held the defend-
ant was not required to answer interrogatories because the action was
penal. Likewise, in United States v. Fishman, ° the court was again
confronted with an action by the government to recover monetary pen-
alties and held the defendant was not required to give a deposition.
At the other extreme, in United States v. LaFontaine9 the court held
the treble damage action to be remedial and required the defendant
to answer a request for admissions.
Perhaps the most equitable position was taken in Porter v.
Heend.92 The district court, explicitly spurning the penal-remedial
dichotomy which LaFontaine used to distinguish Bowles, required the
defendant to supply only such information as would be available from
the examination of business documents. Thus, in Porter the Boyd and
Lees rules were integrated, just as they were in the original Lees deci-
sion.
In conclusion, there appears to be no recent definitive authority
on the question of whether individual defendants should be compelled
to produce testimony incriminating themselves. The penalties under
section 17536 potentially run into the hundreds of thousands, even
millions, of dollars, and without Fifth Amendment privileges defend-
ants could be forced to subject themselves to these heavy sanctions
through their own testimony. However, while the policy behind the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments is the protection of privacy and secu-
rity, section 17536 is designed to regulate public statements. It would
seem reasonable, therefore, to make defendants accountable through
their own testimony for any statements which they have made to mem-
bers of the public. Accordingly the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion should only be available in the following situations: (1) Any
statement which would subject the defendant to true criminal liability,
(2) The most personal documents, and (3) Nonbuisness-related oral
testimony. The evolution of analogous case law discussed above as
well as sound public policy support this result.
88. Id. at 480.
89. 60 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
90. 15 F.R.D. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
91. 12 F.R.D. 518 (R.I. 1953).
92. 6 F.R.D. 588 (N.D. Il. 1947).
1122 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 25
FALSE ADVERTISING LAW
Trial
Jury Trial. Two questions emerge in considering the defendant's
right to a jury trial: (1) Is section 17536 so punitive and criminal
in nature as to entitle defendant to a jury trial under the Sixth Amend-
ment? (2) If there is no guarantee to a jury trial under the United
States Constitution, are there state constitutional provisions providing
for a trial by jury?
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guaran-
tees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ....
There are two procedural contexts in which defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment right to jury trial might arise. First, the judge must decide at
the outset of the trial whether to impanel a jury at all. Second, if
a jury is impanelled but the defense fails to prove its case, the judge
must then decide whether he is empowered to direct a verdict, thereby
denying the defendant his right to take the issues of fact to the jury.
These questions have been resolved definitively under section
17536 by the case of People v. Witzerman.94  In this case the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals held that a defendant in a section 17536 ac-
tion was not entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. This
decision was in accord with similar cases involving monetary penalties,
holding that defendant had no right to a jury trial because of the crim-
inal nature of the penalty per se,95 and holding that a directed verdict
in favor of the prosecuting government does not deny defendant's right
to a jury trial.96
While properly resolving the Sixth Amendment question as to
jury trial, People v. Witzerman rendered, in the authors' opinion, an
unfortunate decision on the defendant's right to a jury trial under the
state constitution. The facts of the case were as follows: The defend-
ants were being prosecuted under section 17536 for misrepresenta-
tions made in the sale of cattle-care sales contracts. At the time of
trial the defendants' sales operation had been shut down for more than
two years without any contemplation of resurrection. Consequently,
defendants offered to stipulate to the issuance of a permanent injunc-
tion barring the making of further representations in regard to the de-
funct cattle program. The prosecuting attorney, however, refused to
so stipulate without an admission of past violations on the defendants'
part. Such an admission, of course, would have exposed the defend-
93. U.S. CONST. Amend. VI.
94. 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1972).
95. See United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914); Madonna v. State, 151 Cal.
App. 2d 836, 312 P.2d 257 (1957).
96. See Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909).
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ants to the massive civil penalties under section 17536; hence the pros-
ecution's demands were not realistic and bordered on the frivolous.
In spite of the mootness of the injunction and the defendants' offer
to stipulate, the trial court held that equitable remedies remained at
issue; and, therefore, defendants were not entitled to a jury trial. The
appellate court affirmed.9 7  Such a capricious manipulation of defend-
ants' rights by the prosecution seems to be unconscionable.
In the future, new remedies under Business and Professions Code
section 17535 make it more likely that equitable remedies, such as
receivership and restitution, will truly remain at issue at the time of
trial."' Even if these remedies are being sought at trial, the California
Constitution requires a jury trial on all issues triable by a jury at com-
mon law.99 An action for civil penalties at common law constituted
an action for debt.10 Being legal rather than equitable in nature,
such actions were tried by a jury at common law. Thus, defendants
are entitled to a jury trial in the assessment of monetary penalties.
Where legal and equitable remedies are mixed, as is usually the case
in actions seeking section 17535' 11 and section 17536 remedies, the
equitable issues under section 17535 may be tried first, 102 but the de-
termination of damages-fixing the specific sum of the penalty under
section 17536-is solely in the province of a jury.10 3
In conclusion, therefore, defendants in an action under section
17536 are not entitled to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment,
as Witzerman correctly held, but are guaranteed a jury trial on all legal
issues under the California Constitution. While equitable issues may
be tried first, the actual assessment of civil penalties represents a legal
issue to be determined by a jury. It is believed, therefore, that Wit-
zerman is subject to further judicial modification.
The Burden of Proof. If section 17536 is deemed criminal in
nature, defendants would be entitled to the presumption of innocence
and would require proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction.
Needless to say, such restrictions would severely hamper false advertis-
ing prosecutions in California. While no appellate case has expressly
97. 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal. Rptr. 284 (1973).
98. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
99. "The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate
. .CAL. CONST. Art. 1, § 7; see People v. One 1941 Chevrolet Coupe, 37 Cal.
2d 283, 231 P.2d 832 (1951).
100. See United States v. Jepson, 90 F. Supp. 983 (D.N.J. 1950); Grossblatt v.
Wright, 108 Cal. App. 2d 457, 239 P.2d 19 (1951).
101. See note 13 supra.
102. E.g., Jaffee v. Albertson Co., 243 Cal. App. 2d 592, 53 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1966).
103. Cf. Pacific Western Oil Co. v. Bern Oil Co., 13 Cal. 2d 60, 87 P.2d 1045
(1939).
1124 [Vol. 25
decided the standard of proof in section 17536 actions, 04 arguments
have been presented in favor of the civil burden of proof.10 5
The leading analogous case is United States v. Regan.0 6 In this
prosecution for civil penalties under the Alien Immigration Act of
1903, the Court squarely decided that the civil burden of proof was
applicable in the recovery of civil penalties. The Court reasoned that
the civil penalty action sounded in debt, being in essence like any
other action for a sum certain. The Court also alluded to analogous
civil actions involving proof of a criminal act, such as, bastardy, divorce,
intentional torts, and other proceedings where proof is by a mere pre-
ponderance of the evidence. Then in a statement of policy, the Court
held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was only required in cases
effecting the life or liberty of the defendant. Thus, in actions for
money only, even though they be great sums of money such as actions
under section 17536, proof by only a preponderance of the evidence
is necessary. To the extent that the lower burden of proof encour-
ages prosecutions, it serves the interests of California consumers. The
lower burden, therefore, is not only sound law but good social policy
as well.
Confrontation. The Sixth Amendment states that "[iln all crim-
inal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . .to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him . . ".07 From this phrase
have been inferred the rights of the defendant to be present, to face
his accuser, and to exclude testimony by deposition. 0 8 Whether the
defendant is entitled to confront witnesses against him in cases involv-
ing civil penalties was settled definitively in United States v. Zucker. 0 9
In this case, the government sought to recover, as a penalty, the value
of merchandise smuggled into the country. The trial court excluded
the deposition of an absent witness on the ground that the action was
104. The trial court in People v. Witzerman, Civil No. 890068 (Super. Ct., Los
Angeles County, California, filed Nov. 25, 1970), af'd, 29 Cal. App. 3d 169, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 284 (1972) expressly held that proof was to be by a preponderance of the evi-
dence. This issue, however, was not raised on appeal.
105. Comment, Actions for False Advertising Under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
§ 17536: An Argument for Applying Civil Rules of Proof, 5 U.S.F.L. Rnv. 440 (1971).
Like may courts, this note first attempted to characterize section 17536 as wholly civil,
and then declare, accordingly, that the civil burden of proof was apropos. In so doing,
the note disregarded such cases as Boyd and Lees which suggest that the sanction of
section 17536 might indeed be criminal in nature, at least for some procedural pur-
poses.
106. 232 U.S. 37 (1914).
107. U.S. CoNsT. Amend. VI.
108. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); 2 JONES ON EvuaNcE § 6.40 (6th ed.
S. Gard ed. 1972).
109. 161 U.S. 475 (1896).
March 19741 FALSE .ADVERTISING IAW
criminal in nature entitling the defendant to the right of confrontation,
but the Supreme Court reversed, holding:
A witness who proves facts entitling the plaintiff in a pro-
ceeding in a Court of the United States, even if the plaintiff be
the government, to a judgment for money only, and not to a judg-
ment which directly involves the personal safety of the defendant,
is not, within the meaning of the sixth amendment, a witness
against an "accused" in a criminal prosecution; and his evidence
may be brought before the jury, in the form of a deposition, taken
as prescribed by the statutes regulating the mode in which depo-
sitions to be used in the courts of the United States may be taken.
The defendant in such a case, is no more entitled to be confronted
at the trial with the witnesses of the plaintiff than he would be
in a case where the evidence related to a claim for money that
could be established without disclosing any facts tending to show
the commission of crime. 110
To date no cases have deviated from Zucker. Defendant in a
civil penalty action, therefore, has no right to confront his accusers.
Judgment
Double Jeopardy. The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment may be applicable to prosecutions under section 17536
in the following context: If the defendant has been tried under the
misdemeanor statute, section 17534, he could attempt to invoke the
double jeopardy clause to bar prosecution under section 17536 on the
theory that he could not be twice subjected to severe punishment for
the same act."' As noted previously, however, the misdemeanor
sanction of section 17534 is so trifling when compared to the civil pen-
alties of section 17536, that it is rarely used." 12  Indeed, defendants
in section 17536 actions are routinely granted immunity from criminal
prosecution under section 17534 to assure that they cannot use the
threat of prosecution under that sanction to invoke the Fifth Amend-
ment and frustrate discovery."13
Even though the double jeopardy question has not been specifi-
cally presented in a section 17536 action, defendants have often raised
the question of subsequent prosecution in similar situations under an-
alogous statutory schemes, where there are co-existing criminal and
civil sanctions. Precedent clearly holds, however, that the legislature
can enact a criminal and a civil penalty for the same conduct and that
prosecution under one of the two statutes does not bar prosecution
110. Id.at481.
111. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb .... ."U.S. CONsT. Amend. V.
112. See text accompanying notes 11-12 supra.
113. See text accompanying note 86 supra.
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under the other 14 (although principles of res judicata may come into
play).1" 5
Enforcing the Judgment Outside the State. As discussed pre-
viously, the general rule is that penalties such as section 17536 will
not be enforced across state lines." 0 Many false advertising rackets
are based on collapsible schemes which operate dishonestly until the
last possible minute, when, just before the ax falls, the racketeers van-
ish across the state's borders. The unscrupulousness of such behavior
may make theft or criminal fraud remedies more desirable than the
monetary penalties of section 17536. Still, the entry of a large judg-
ment for penalties, even though not collectable outside the state,
would deter the false advertiser from returning to California. At the
same time, the prosecuting attorney could seek equitable remedies un-
der section 17535 to achieve divestiture through restitution and cessa-
tion of activities through an injunction." 7  Such equitable remedies
would, of course, be enforced extraterritorially through comity. Thus,
while the moneys assessed under section 17536 may not be collected
outside California, the state is not left without remedies with which
to combat out-of-state false advertisers. Meanwhile, the penalties of
section 17536 will deter the wrongdoers from re-entering the state, and
thereby will serve a beneficial purpose for California consumers.
Conclusion
The severe monetary penalties of California Business and Profes-
sions Code section 17536 make it potentially the most effective
weapon against false advertising in California. It is socially desirable
to have such strong and effective sanctions available to public prosecu-
tors without imposing on them undue procedural constructions. On
the other hand, defendants exposed to severe and retributive penalties
cannot be denied procedural due process of law.
114. E.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States
ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). See also United States v. Alcatex, Inc.,
328 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
115. If defendant has been prosecuted on the criminal charge under § 17534, the
state will be estopped from pursuing the civil penalty action. Coffey v. United States,
116 U.S. 436 (1886). See also McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d 739, 746 (6th
Cir. 1971) (Weick, I., concurring).
116. The general rule that one state will not enforce the penal laws of another
state was laid down in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892). There is some
small evidence of erosion of this doctrine in Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co.,
296 U.S. 268 (1935), where the Supreme Court ordered Illinois to give full faith and
credit to a Wisconsin judgment for taxes, including a 5 percent penalty. The basis
of decision emphasized the tax aspects of the recovery, and as such, casts doubt as
to the enforcement of the minimal 5 percent penalty standing alone.
117. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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An examination of authority has shown that predominantly civil
procedures will apply to prosecutions under Business and Professions
Code section 17536, in spite of its extremely punitive nature. Few
criminal protections potentially apply, namely: the criminal statute of
limitations (to a limited extent), the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, the protection against double jeopardy, and the unenforceability
of the penalty across state lines.
By statutory amendment, the legislature recently expanded the
limitation period for section 17536 actions to three years from date
of discovery by the consumer or the prosecutor, but that amendment
only became effective March 7, 1973. For offenses committed prior
to that date, therefore, a one-year statute of limitations applies, so that
the prosecutions of offenses pre-dating March 7, 1973 are barred.
Such a limitation, however, is of decreasing significance as every day
passes, and certainly offers no bar to vigorous prosecution of present
offenses.
The procedural consequence of granting the privilege against
self-incrimination is that the defendant may not be compelled to give
testimony either in a deposition or at trial. We have seen, however,
that the courts have eroded the privilege against self-incrimination in
the production of business-related documents. It seems, therefore,
that business-related testimony should be equally available; for an ad-
vertiser who makes representations to the public should be accountable
for those representations, even though he may be subjected to civil
penalties for failing to advertise honestly. It should also be remem-
bered that the privilege against self-incrimination applies only to nat-
ural persons and thus no privilege exists for corporate defendants. So,
if the law evolves in accordance with the current trend, the privilege
against self-incrimination should not present a significant barrier to ef-
fective enforcement of California's false advertising law.
Nor should the double jeopardy clause inhibit effective false ad-
vertising prosecutions in California, because it can only be invoked
when there has been a prior criminal prosecution, and immunity from
criminal prosecution (under the misdemeanor provision of Business
and Professions Code section 17534) is routinely granted.
The lack of extraterritorial enforceability of the penalties should
not bar effective use of section 17536, even though the actual moneys
may never be collected. Criminal and equitable remedies may be
asserted extraterritorially to combat out-of-state false advertisers.
Meanwhile, just having on the California judgment rolls a substantial
personal judgment in the form of a civil penalty entered against the
individual wrongdoers would tend to deter these operators from ever
returning to the state. If so, then section 17536 will have adequately
fulfilled its purpose.
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The use of predominantly civil procedures in section 17536 ac-
tions will, of course, aid California prosecutors in the efficient prosecu-
tion of false advertisers, thereby benefiting California consumers as
a whole. In addition, these findings are relevant to procedures to
be followed under other "civil" penalties, and thus have a broader
significance: for trade regulation and consumer protection laws in
other states; for pollution control laws throughout the country; as well
as for other socially oriented statutes which use monetary penalties
to enforce desirable regulations. Thus, the civil penalty may become
an even more important tool in the development of effective and pro-
gressive regulations for the benefit of the public.
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